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On the social and personal value of existence1 
Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve 
April 22, 2014 
 
Abstract 
If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we coherently regard his 
coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation 
in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should 
be answered affirmatively. We also explain where prominent arguments to differing conclusions go wrong. 
Finally, we explore the relevance of our answers to issues in population ethics. 
Keywords: Population ethics; value of existence. 
 
Introduction 
It is certainly better for all of us that John Broome exists and it would have been worse for 
us if he had never existed. This alone would have given anyone with the power to decide 
whether John Broome would exist a good reason to ensure his existence. But supposing, as 
we hope is true, that Broome’s life is also good for him, in the sense that he enjoys high 
lifetime well-being, is it therefore also better for him that he exists and would it have been 
worse for him if he had never existed? In this chapter, we argue that these questions should 
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be answered affirmatively. We also explore the relevance of our answers to issues in 
population ethics. 
1. The alleged absurdity of the claim that existence is better than never existing 
Broome (1999, 2004) has developed an ethics of population which does not involve any 
comparison, from the perspective of a person’s self-interest, between her existence and her 
never existing. Whether it is better to bring a person into existence than not to bring her 
into existence is only considered in terms of social welfare (or social goodness, more 
generally). Broome argues that such social evaluation should take the following form. If a 
potential individual would have a level of well-being equivalent to what we shall call the 
“population-value indifference level” of well-being (often referred to as the “critical level”), 
then her coming into existence with this level of well-being would be a matter of 
indifference from the perspective of social value. If she would have a level of well-being in 
excess of this level, then her existence would increase the value of the population, and so 
make the world a better place. If this individual would instead have a level of well-being 
below this level, then her existence would make the world worse. This approach therefore 
has no need for the notion of a life that is better for an individual (considering only her well-
being) than her not coming into existence would be for her.  
Broome offers the following argument for eschewing the notion of a life that is better for 
the person than her never coming into existence is for her. It cannot be better for a person 
to exist than never to exist, because this would mean that it would be worse for her if she 
never came into existence, a statement that is deemed absurd because, Broome claims, 
there would be no one for whom the latter would be worse. As he writes: 
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“[I]t cannot ever be true that it is better for a person that she lives than that she 
should never have lived at all. If it were better for a person that she lives than that 
she should never have lived at all, then if she had never lived at all, that would have 
been worse for her than if she had lived. But if she had never lived at all, there would 
have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could not have been worse for her” 
(1999, p. 168; emphasis in original). 
As a consequence, in Broome’s view, the notion of “a life worth living” cannot be used in the 
sense of comparing a life of a particular quality to never existing. Rather, it only refers to the 
value of extending life (i.e., making a given life last longer, without considering the problem 
of the creation of a new life), and should really be called a “life worth continuing.” 
In the literature, this argument is often decomposed into the following basic elements:2 
Call a description of who exists and at what level(s) of well-being a “social situation.”  
(1) Social situation A is better than social situation B for a person P if and only if B is 
worse than A for P.3 
(2)  If A is better than B for P, then A would be better than B for P if it obtained.4 
(3)  (a) A person who never exists has no well-being; and  
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adjustments to the corresponding formulation, and similarly “worse than” stands for “worse than (better 
than).” 
3
 Bykvist (2007) refers to this premise as “Converse.” 
4
 Bykvist (2007) refers to this premise as “Accessibility;” Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2010) as “Subjunctive 
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 (b) Nothing can be better than anything else for a person who never exists.5 
On the basis of these conditions, the argument runs as follows. From (1) and (2), it follows 
that if a particular life is better for P than never existing, then never existing would be worse 
for P than that life if P never came into existence. From (3), it follows that never existing 
could not be worse for P than anything if P never came into existence. Hence it cannot be 
the case that there is a life that is better for P than never existing.  
2. Others’ responses to the argument  
Several authors who endorse the argument remark that while it rules out comparative 
judgments about whether a given life is better or worse for a person than his never existing,  
it permits non-comparative claims about the good and ill done to a person by causing her to 
exist with a particular level of well-being. For example, Krister Bykvist (2007, 2013) endorses 
the aforementioned three conditions but holds that a life may be good for an individual 
even though it is not better for her than never existing. Similarly, Elizabeth Harman (2004) 
argues that one can harm someone by creating her if her life contains particular bad 
features, where it is not necessary for the existence of such harm that leading the life in 
question is worse for her than never existing. 
However, many authors seem uncomfortable with the absence of any comparative 
evaluation of existence vis-à-vis never existing. They therefore believe that we should try to 
relax at least one of the three premises. One possibility is proposed by Melinda Roberts 
(2003, pp. 168-9), who rejects (3a) and (3b), when she assimilates never existing to a zero 
level of well-being, implying that in some sense a person who never exists has a level of 
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well-being. However, we believe Roberts is wrong to reject (3a), since we do not think that it 
makes sense to assign a level of well-being to a never-existing person. After all, well-being 
implies being. 
A different approach is taken by Nils Holtug (2001, p. 374) and Gustaf Arrhenius and Wlodek 
Rabinowicz (2010), who argue that premise (2) is too strong. What is needed for the claim 
that existence in social situation A with a high level of well-being is better for a person P 
than his never existing in B is a three-part relation between A, B, and P. This relation can 
exist, they claim, only if the person exists. Since, when P exists, all three relata exist, it can 
make sense to assert that A is better for him than B. But, contrary to (2), one cannot 
conclude from this that it would have been worse for P if he had not existed, because in that 
scenario, one of the elements in the relation in question would not exist. As Arrhenius and 
Rabinowicz put it: 
“A triadic relation consisting in one state [leading a life of a particular quality] being 
better for a person than another state [never existing] cannot hold unless all three 
relata exist. Now, the states in question are abstract objects and can indeed be 
assumed to exist even if they do not actually obtain. However, if [as is assumed] a 
person is a concrete object, (...) then the relation could not hold if [the] person 
weren’t alive, since [one of the relata] would not exist. Consequently, even if it is 
better for [the person] to exist than not to exist (...), [contrary to premise (2),] it 
doesn’t follow that it would have been worse for [the person] if [he] did not exist, 
since one of the relata would then be absent” (2010, pp. 405-6). 
As a consequence, they propose to weaken (2) as follows to make an exception for cases in 
which P doesn’t exist in one of the two states being compared: 
6 
 
(2)’  (a) If P exists in both A and B, then A is better for P than B if and only if B 
 would be worse for P than A, if B obtained; and 
(b) If P exists in A but not in B, then A can be better for P than B although B 
would not be worse for P than A, if B obtained (2010, p. 407). 
3. Why it is not absurd to claim that existence is better than never existing 
In contrast with the aforementioned authors, we accept (1), (2), and (3a), but propose to 
revise (3b) in such a way that the resulting principle is weak enough to be consistent with 
the claim that a good life can be better for a person than never existing. 
As we have seen, Holtug (2001) and Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2010) accept (3b) because 
they want to avoid assertions of the following kind about someone who did not come into 
existence but who would have had a good life, had he existed: “It is worse for this person 
not to exist.” They also want to avoid assertions of the following kind about someone who 
exists with a high level of well-being: “It would have been worse for her had she never come 
into existence.” The reason seems to be that they want their analysis to be consistent with 
the following principle: 
No Properties of the Never-Existent: An individual who never exists cannot have any 
properties, not even the relational property of something being better or worse for 
her (Holtug 2001, p. 370). 
We shall now argue that this principle should be rejected because it is too strong.  
In certain circumstances, there is a clear appeal to the thesis that a never-existing person 
has no properties. For example, the thesis is true when the comparison is made exclusively 
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between social situations in which the person never exists. But the thesis seems to us to be 
false when the comparison involves a counterfactual situation in which the person would 
exist with definite, identifying characteristics. 
Suppose we consider a never-existing person who could have existed in a counterfactual 
situation in which this person would have had a great life. Such assumptions give properties 
to the never-existing person we are thinking about. For one, this person has the property of 
“having a great life in the counterfactual situation.” More generally, this person has all the 
characteristics that are assigned to her in our description of her situation in the 
counterfactual state. 
This is just a straightforward generalization of common discussions of counterfactual states. 
When we talk about what would have happened if Pope Francis had married, there is no 
metaphysical conundrum about the identity and characteristics of Jorge Maria Bergoglio in 
this counterfactual state. Similarly, when we talk about what would have happened if 
Vincent van Gogh would have had a fourth sister (with particular identifying characteristics) 
instead of his brother Theo, we imagine a person who is different than an existing person 
without making this hypothetical person a mysterious entity. By a very minor extension, we 
can talk meaningfully about hypothetical persons who never exist and who are not 
variations or replacements of existing persons, but whom we can nevertheless richly 
describe. We can talk about the additional children that Nelson would have had with Emma 
Hamilton if he had not died at Trafalgar (describing them in a manner that would uniquely 
identify them), and imagine the different lives they could have had depending on various 
counterfactual assumptions. There is no greater mystery in establishing the truth conditions 
for the statement that it is worse for Nelson’s hypothetical son not to have been born 
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(supposing he would have had a great life) than in establishing the truth conditions for the 
statement that it is worse for the Pope not to have married (supposing he would have had a 
good marriage). 
In ordinary discourse, a person is not just a concrete entity who exists in the actual world. 
Instead, it is the set of possible descriptions associated with the same identity in all the 
counterfactual states we care to describe. This set may include states in which the person 
never exists. The literature seems to have failed to see the difference between persons as 
concrete objects and persons as they figure in ordinary discourse. A concrete object has 
properties only in the states in which it exists, and one cannot say that a person would be 
taller in a state in which she does not exist than in the current state in which she does. But 
when we discuss possible people, the topic of our debate is not only concrete persons. 
Instead, it is persons as they are considered by evaluators of possible worlds, evaluators 
who assess these worlds from the perspective of these persons’ interests. For an observer 
who compares two different possible worlds, in one of which a person exists and in one of 
which she never exists, it makes sense to compare these worlds for the sake of this person. 
For a discourse about a person and how different states can be ranked for her sake, it does 
not even matter whether the person is purely fictional. The only requirement for meaningful 
comparative evaluation of states from the perspective of a person’s interests (i.e., as better 
or worse for her) is that the description of every state in which she exists includes 
information on her level of well-being in that state and the description of every state in 
which she never exists mentions the fact that she does not come into existence.6 
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the possibility that merely possible persons have a weak form of existence. They rightly reject the idea that 
9 
 
In sum, suppose that in situation A, person P would have a good life, and that in B, he would 
never exist. Accepting (1) and (2), it makes sense to hold not merely that if A were to obtain, 
then A would be better for P than B, but also that, if B were the actual situation, then his 
never existing would be worse for him than A. If B were actual, then the fact that this person 
does not come into existence in the current situation is compatible with the fact that in the 
counterfactual situation there would be a person with characteristics that are sufficiently 
definite to make possible the latter comparison. 
Note that, as mentioned, we endorse (3a). Since a person who never exists has no well-
being, the statement “it is worse for her never to exist than to exist” cannot mean that in 
the former case, she has a lower level of well-being than in the latter. But one can sensibly 
hold that a particular life can be better for a person than never existing without assigning a 
level of well-being to never existing. It is sufficient that there is a level of well-being, when 
existing, that is deemed equivalent to never existing. (Call this the “personal-value 
indifference level” of well-being; it is often referred to as the “neutral level.”) Then, we 
submit, enjoying a greater well-being than this level implies that a person’s life is better for 
her than never existing. It also implies that her never existing would be worse for her than 
existence. 
Our proposal is, therefore, to replace (3) with the following, weaker condition. 
(3’)  (a) A non-existing person has no level of well-being; and  
                                                                                                                                                                     
such objects can have something like a level of well-being. However, they do not seriously consider the 
possibility that if a merely possible person has well-defined well-being levels in counterfactual states, this is 
sufficient to make the comparison between the person’s lives in these states and his never existing meaningful 
in states in which he does not exist. 
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(b’) Nothing can be better than anything else for a person who exists in none 
of the (actual and counterfactual) states under consideration. 
The combination of (1), (2), and (3’) is compatible with the idea that existence at a high level 
of well-being is better for P than non-existence and that this is true whether or not he 
actually exists. It is also compatible with holding that existence at a very low level of well-
being is worse for P than non-existence and that this is true whether or not he exists. 
4. A difficulty for other views 
As we shall now explain, this lack of dependence of the truth of such judgments on the 
actual state of the world gives our proposal an advantage over the proposal advanced by 
Holtug and by Arrhenius and Rabinowicz. Consider a not-yet-existing, potential person P 
who would have an awful life if he were to come into existence and whose existence 
depends on our decision. On the view we propose, it would be worse for P to come into 
existence and it would be better for him if he never came into existence. This is just to say 
that, if we were acting solely for his sake, we would not create him. By contrast, the view 
proposed by Holtug and by Arrhenius and Rabinowicz holds that if P were to come into 
existence, then his existence would be worse for him and that if he did not come into 
existence, then his never existing would be neither better than, nor worse than, nor equally 
good as existence for him. These judgments alone do not determine how one should rank 
not-yet-existing, contingent person P’s existence and his never existing when considering 
only P’s interests. To do so, their view requires further assumptions. 
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz appeal to the figure of potential, contingent P’s “guardian angel,” 
who must make decisions only for P’s sake. Of this angel, they write: 
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“[I]f [P’s] guardian angel has a choice between bringing her charge into existence 
with negative welfare [and] not bringing [him] into existence at all, she would choose 
the latter. Moreover, if the guardian angel had the choice between bringing her 
charge into existence with a positive welfare [and] not bringing [him] into existence, 
she would choose the former. (…) [I]t seems reasonable to say that in the choice 
between bringing P into existence with negative welfare [and] not bringing [him] into 
existence at all, one ought to prefer the latter for P’s sake. Likewise, in the choice 
between bringing P into existence with positive welfare [and] not bringing [him] into 
existence at all, one ought to prefer the former for P’s sake” (2010, pp. 410-11). 
They also propose that we take the expression “one ought to prefer never existing to 
existing at a low level of well-being for P’s sake” simply to mean “never existing is better for 
P than existing with a low level of well-being” (2010, p. 411). 
Jointly, these proposals have unappealing implications. For they imply the following two 
statements about P’s situation: 
(i) When P does not yet exist, but might be brought into existence, the situation in 
which he exists is worse for him than the situation in which he does not exist, and 
the latter is better for him. 
(ii) If P is not brought into existence (and he can no longer be brought into 
existence), then his never-existing is no longer better for him than his existence. 
This shift in the circumstances under which the statement “P’s never existing is better for 
him than his existence at a very low level of well-being” is held to be true is very peculiar. If 
never being brought into existence is better for P now (when he does not yet exist, but can 
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be brought into existence), then how can it fail to remain better for him once an irrevocable 
decision has been made not to bring him into existence? 
Of course, an analogous problem arises for Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’ view if the not-yet-
existing, contingent P would have a wonderful life. On their view, it would then be true that: 
(iii) When P does not yet exist, but might be brought into existence, the situation in 
which he exists is better for him than the situation in which he does not exist and the 
latter is worse for him; and 
(iv) If P is irrevocably not brought into existence, then never existing is no longer 
worse for him than existence. 
Again, such a shift seems to us very implausible. 
Holtug (2001, p. 375ff) takes a different approach, but nonetheless seems to face the same 
problem. According to Holtug, we “extrinsically harm” a person by failing to bring him into 
existence rather than causing him to exist if and only if (a) bringing him into existence would 
have been intrinsically better for him; and (b) bringing him into existence would not 
intrinsically harm him. As a consequence, Holtug holds that if not-yet-existing, contingent 
P’s life would be a good one, then it would harm P not to bring him into existence and it 
would benefit P to bring him into existence. He adds that, on his view, “it is difficult to resist 
the claim that, everything else being equal, we ought to cause [P] to exist” (p. 384). The 
reason that Holtug finds this claim difficult to resist is, we surmise, that, on his view, if one 
takes only the interests of potential, contingent P into account and so chooses for P’s sake, 
one ought to prefer P’s existence to his never existing. If one then makes the further, 
natural assumption that “preferring P’s existence to his never existing for P’s sake” is just to 
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say that one takes P’s existence to be better for him than his never existing, then Holtug’s 
view leads to the same conclusion as Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’ view. When P does not yet 
exist and his existence depends on our choice, then the state in which P is brought into 
existence with a high level of well-being is judged to be better for him, but if we choose not 
to bring him into existence, and this choice is irreversible, then it is no longer considered 
worse for P that he was not brought into existence. 
In sum, we have argued that views that reject (2) in favour of (2’) face a dilemma. They must 
either refuse to rank potential, contingent P’s existence against P’s never existing for P’s 
sake, or give up the natural assumption that ranking them for his sake is just to rank them as 
better or worse for him. The view we have proposed does not face this dilemma. 
5. Implications for population ethics 
Why is it so important whether one can compare existence to never existing from the point 
of view of the affected person’s interests? The stakes are often traced to the following 
principle.  
Person-Affecting Principle (PAP): A social situation cannot be better than another if it 
is not better for someone. 
Suppose this principle is correct. Also suppose (contrary to our arguments) that one cannot 
compare existence to never existing from the perspective of a person’s interests. Then one 
faces the unpleasant prospect of being unable to compare social situations with totally 
disjoint populations. This is so even when social situation A is obviously better than B, 
because, say, everyone who exists in A (call them the x-people) has a very high level of well-
being and everyone who exists in B (the y-people) has an awful life.  
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Accepting that existence can be better for a person than never existing seems a way out of 
this conundrum. If one adopts Holtug’s and Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’ proposal, then the 
PAP is compatible with the claim that A is better than B, because it is better for the x-people 
to exist with a high level of well-being rather than never to exist. However, as Arrhenius and 
Rabinowicz (2013, p. 15) note, when paired with their proposal for ranking existence vis-à-
vis never existing, the PAP is still too restrictive. Consider the choice between A, which 
contains only x-people who lead wonderful lives, and C, in which the x-people are as well off 
as in A, but which also contains y-people who have awful lives. Since, on Holtug’s and on 
Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’ view, A is not better for anyone (it is not better for the x-people 
because they are equally well off in C, and it is not better for the y-people, since they do not 
exist in A), it follows from the PAP that A is not better than C. 
By contrast, on our proposal for ranking existence vis-à-vis never existing, these two 
difficulties for the PAP do not arise: A can be said to be better than B because it is better for 
the x-people that they exist than that they never exist, and A can be said to be better than 
C, because it is better for the y-people that they are not brought into existence to lead awful 
lives. Nonetheless, in combination with our view, the PAP might still be regarded as too 
strong, because it rules out several seemingly reasonable views in population ethics, 
including Broome’s theory supplemented with a notion of a personal-value indifference 
level that is below the population-value indifference level. To illustrate: suppose that A 
consists entirely of well off x-people, while D consists of these x-people at the same level of 
well-being plus y-people at a relatively low level of well-being which is barely above the 
personal-value indifference level. Since, on our view, D is better for the y-people and worse 
for no one, the PAP holds that A cannot be better than D. But if, as is typically supposed, the 
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population-value indifference level is significantly higher than the personal-value 
indifference level, then A is better than D. Paired with our view, the PAP would therefore 
rule out such a variant of Broome’s view.  
In sum, when paired with our view, the PAP is too restrictive, because it rules out 
reasonable views like a variant of Broome’s view. But one would also like to say more than 
the PAP says.  
Our diagnosis of some of the PAP’s shortcomings is this: insofar as the motivation for the 
PAP is that it is well-being that ultimately matters, this motivation is ill-served by a principle 
that focuses on the identity of the well-being bearers. As a starting point for a different 
basic principle, we therefore propose the obviously correct claim that a social situation with 
only one person is better than another social situation with only one person if well-being is 
greater in the former.  
We propose the following way of extending this to situations with a fixed number of people. 
It is enough to find a one-to-one mapping from one social situation to the other so that each 
individual in the former is better off than her counterpart in the latter. This is the Suppes-
Sen Principle, which combines the Pareto Principle for a given population size with 
anonymity. 
Suppes-Sen Principle (SSP): A social situation A is better than B if they have the same 
population size and the level of well-being is better at every anonymized position 
(rank in the distribution of well-being), from the worst-off to the best-off position.7 
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 This is equivalent to Parfit’s (1984, p. 360) Principle Q. While we find this principle attractive, we should note 
that, as Parfit mentions, it rules out some so-called “claim-based” views of population ethics. On these views, 
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Can we extend this principle to comparisons of social situations with different numbers of 
people, without ruling out reasonable views in population ethics? This is indeed possible as 
follows: 
Variable-Population SSP: A social situation A is better than B if there are two 
situations A’ and B’ such that: 
a. A’ is as good as A and B’ is as good as B; 
b. A’ and B’ have the same population size; and 
c. The level of well-being in A’ is higher at every position than in B’. 
This principle does not commit us to anything particular about the value of increasing 
population size. It is, for instance, satisfied by total utilitarianism,8 average utilitarianism,9 
                                                                                                                                                                     
people do not have a claim to be brought into existence, but they do have a claim to have their quality of life 
improved if they exist. Now consider a choice between state E, in which Charles comes into existence with 60 
utils, Dan with 80, and Edward never exists, and state F, in which Charles has 79 utils, Dan never exists, and 
Edward exists with 60 utils. (Assume that a life with more than 0 utils is better for a person than never 
existing.) Then no one has a claim against F, whereas Charles has a strong claim against E. On some claim-
based views, Charles’ claim should override impersonal goodness. Parfit (2010, section 78) argues that such 
views are therefore problematic; Otsuka (2014) offers a defence of such views. Indeed, there seems to be a 
tension between the Suppes-Sen principle and claim-based views even in fixed-identity cases (see Voorhoeve 
[2014] for an example). 
8
 A’ (B’) can have a single individual whose utility is the total utility in A (B). 
9
 A’ (B’) can have a single individual whose utility is the average utility in A (B). 
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and “critical-level,” or (as we would call it) “population-value indifference-level 
utilitarianism.”10 
One may note that for fixed populations, the PAP is weaker than the Pareto Principle 
because it never requires a comparison to be made in a certain way (it only precludes 
certain relations). A similar variant can be formulated for the Variable Population SSP:  
Weak Variable Population SSP: Social situation B cannot be better than A if there are 
two situations A’ and B’ such that: 
a. A’ is as good as A and B’ is as good as B; 
b. A’ and B’ have the same population size; and 
c. The level of well-being in A’ is higher at every position than in B’. 
Finally, we note that the Suppes-Sen Principle involves interpersonal comparisons. Can one 
formulate a principle which, like Pareto and the PAP, involves only intrapersonal 
comparisons but which applies to different populations and does not imply the notorious 
Mere Addition Principle? (This principle holds that raising the well-being of incumbents and 
adding new people just barely above the personal well-being indifference level always 
improves the social situation.) This seems impossible. In particular, it is impossible to 
sensibly compare disjoint populations without making interpersonal comparisons. 
                                                     
10
 A’ (B’) can have a single individual whose utility above the population-value indifference level is the total 
utility in A (B) minus the population-value indifference level multiplied by the population size of A (B). 
18 
 
6. Challenges to our view 
The conjunction of our view on the value of existence and the Variable-Population SSP does 
not, as far as we can see, have counterintuitive implications for population ethics. However, 
the idea that existence at a high level of well-being is better for a person than never existing 
may be thought to have such implications when paired with other apparently attractive 
principles. First, if one accepts our view and the Pareto Principle, then the Mere Addition 
Principle follows: if adding an individual does not have negative effects on others, then it is 
better to add an individual to the population so long as his level of well-being is in excess of 
the personal-value indifference level. If one also assumes inequality aversion, then one 
cannot avoid the infamous Repugnant Conclusion, which holds that a sufficiently populous 
social situation in which everyone’s quality of life is just barely in excess of the personal-
value indifference level is better than a social situation with a smaller, uniformly well-off 
population.11 
                                                     
11
 Once adding persons just above the personal-value indifference level is deemed acceptable, then 
redistributing between a very large number of such additional people and the incumbents can create a very 
large population with an equalized level of well-being that is arbitrarily close to the personal-value indifference 
level.  
Note that a similar problem arises for Arrhenius and Rabinowicz’ view when combined with a version of the 
Pareto Principle which they propose, viz.:  
Subjunctive Weak Pareto (SWP): If state A would be better than state B for everyone who would exist 
if A were to obtain, and for everyone who would exist if B were to obtain, then A is better than B. 
As Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2013) note, their view and SWP together imply a variant of the Mere Addition 
Principle, and therefore, assuming inequality aversion, entail the Repugnant Conclusion.  
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Second, as we discuss elsewhere in detail (Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 2014), the view that 
existence with a high level of well-being is better than non-existence may have unpalatable 
implications when it is paired with a common view about fairness. To illustrate, suppose 
that Fiona and Georgina both exist. Matters are so fixed that precisely one of them will, due 
to an untreated illness, have a life at the personal-value indifference level, which we can set 
at 0 utils. The other will get a treatment which will give her a good life. If Fiona is treated, 
she will have a lifetime well-being of 70 utils; if Georgina is treated, she will have 69 utils. 
You must choose the probability p that the treatment will go to Fiona, with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. 
(Georgina’s chance of receiving the treatment is therefore (1-p).) In this case, a plausible 
view of fairness requires that you give them both equal chances of treatment.12 
Next suppose that neither Fiona nor Georgina exist and that precisely one of them will come 
into existence. If Fiona exists, her well-being will be 70 utils; if Georgina exists, her well-
being will be 69 utils. You must choose the probability p that Fiona will exist. If existence is 
better than non-existence and if fairness applies to these benefits as it would to benefits to 
already existing individuals, then fairness requires you to equalize their chances of 
existence. However, it is counterintuitive that you would be acting unfairly to Georgina in 
this case if you minimized her chance of existence and maximized Fiona’s chance of 
existence.13 
                                                     
12
 See, for example, Broome (1990). 
13
 Bykvist (2013) expresses similar concerns about the idea of valuing never existing as equivalent from the 
perspective of the person’s interests to living at well-being level of zero. If a never-existing, but at one time 
possible, person were treated just like an existing person with a well-being of zero, then this would imply that 
there is a staggering and heretofore unrecognized amount of inequality. 
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It seems to us that these challenges reveal that the good that one could do for a contingent 
person by creating her may not always have the same moral force as the good one could do 
for an already existing person (or a person whose future existence is determined 
independently of our choices). Naturally, this difference in moral force requires explanation, 
which we cannot offer here.14 But if there is indeed such a difference, then one should not 
simply extend the Pareto Principle to variable-population cases; nor should one apply 
standard ideas about the fairness of equal chances to a benefit for already existing people 
to cases in which the benefit is coming into existence with a high level of well-being.  
7. A challenge to welfare-based approaches to the value of existence 
So far, we have followed the literature in focusing only on the well-being (understood as 
what is in the person’s self-interest or what is of prudential value for him) that is enjoyed in 
the envisioned life in order to determine the personal or social value of a person’s existence. 
But this is a highly limiting assumption, because it ignores people’s views on how values 
besides well-being determine the value of their existence.  
Consider a man whose life consists mostly of struggles and suffering and who has few 
pleasures and achievements. Suppose a neighbour says to him: “Your well-being is so low 
that your life is not worth living.” This man can reasonably feel insulted by this remark. He 
may sensibly regard his existence as of great value, even though he would much prefer 
being spared his trials. He may, for example, have acted well towards others, intelligently 
pursued noble aims (even though he did not achieve these aims), and responded to 
                                                     
14
 Some have argued that the explanation is that a person cannot be wronged by an action if she would never 
exist if that action would be performed (Roberts 1998; Vallentyne 2000). 
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adversity with fortitude. And he may, quite sensibly, believe that this makes his life a 
valuable one, albeit one with a very low level of well-being. (Or, if he is a religious man, he 
may believe that his existence is valuable because it is part of God’s plan.) Symmetrically, a 
villain who repents of his wrong-doing at the end of his days may have a dim view of the 
value of his existence even though standard measures of lifetime well-being would put him 
well above the personal- value indifference level and even though, as chance would have it, 
the consequences of his crimes for others’ well-being were minor. 
What these examples suggest is that well-being is not the only consideration that matters in 
the evaluation of a person’s life relative to his never existing. Whether a life is worth living 
or not from a person’s reasonable15 comprehensive moral perspective is a deeper question 
than the question whether his well-being exceeds a particular level. Comparing existence to 
never existing from the viewpoint of the personal value of individual well-being may, at least 
on some people’s reasonable comprehensive views, be just as beside the point as 
comparing Matisse to Cezanne by the size of their paintings.16 
In sum, there is a mismatch between the evaluation of existence in terms of individuals’ 
comprehensive moral views and the welfare-based evaluation of existence. Individuals can 
answer the existential question on the basis of different philosophical and religious values, 
which cannot be exhaustively accounted for by a suitable notion of well-being.  
                                                     
15
 We here employ the term “reasonable” in Rawls’s (2005) sense. 
16
 A similar problem occurs for the notion of a “life worth continuing” when well-being is defined in such a way 
that it may run against the individual’s own judgment (based on her comprehensive moral view) about 
whether her life is worth continuing. 
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These observations might suggest the following argument in favour of an approach that, like 
Broome’s, avoids appealing to the notion of a life worth living. 
Social welfare evaluation relies on a population-value indifference level that is 
defined in terms of well-being only. From the perspective of social welfare 
evaluation, a judgment that a person’s well-being is below the population-value 
indifference level and therefore lowers social welfare does not imply that his 
existence is bad for him, or bad in terms of a more comprehensive set of values. It 
just means that social welfare is improved only when new members are above his 
level. Being told that one’s life is not worth living is very different from being told 
that it is bad for the social distribution of welfare. It is therefore more legitimate to 
evaluate the contribution to social welfare of additions to the population in terms of 
individual welfare only than to judge the value of an individual’s existence (versus his 
never existing) in terms of his welfare only. 
However, obviously, this defence of Broome’s approach is fragile and observations similar to 
the preceding ones could be used to raise an objection against his theory. Why make social 
evaluation so distant from the assessments that people will make on the basis of their 
reasonable comprehensive moral views? And, why shouldn’t one feel insulted when the 
criterion for social evaluation assesses one’s existence negatively even though one deems 
one’s own existence valuable in spite of one’s low level of well-being?  
In sum, both an exclusively welfare-based assessment of whether an individual’s life is 
worth living and an exclusively welfare-based assessment of whether an individual’s 
existence improves the distribution of well-being are problematic.  
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One may object to this conclusion in two ways. First, one may reject the idea that 
individuals’ evaluations of their existence are generally very different from well-being 
evaluations. This is an empirical counter-argument which may be correct, but which does 
not address the philosophical problem.17 Moreover, even if only a handful of individuals 
reject an exclusively well-being based approach to the value of existence, it remains an open 
question how to take their perspective into consideration.  
Another possible response is to broaden the measure of the value of an individual’s life that 
one uses in assessing whether an individual’s existence adds personal or social value. The 
idea would be to move beyond well-being narrowly construed as self-interested or 
prudential value. On a broadly defined preference-and-value approach, the value of life 
could be determined by whether people think their life is worth living, taking full account of 
their reasonable comprehensive moral views. One would then develop a notion of individual 
and social value that would incorporate the diversity of values of the members of the 
population. 
There are two difficulties with this solution. First, unless we adopt the above-mentioned 
idea that benefits that come from being brought into existence have a different moral force 
than benefits to existing people, relying on people’s views on the value of existence would 
suggest that it is good to add people to society when they think their life is worth living in 
this broader sense (and no incumbent is affected). A version of the Mere Addition Principle 
will therefore obtain, as will a variant of the Repugnant Conclusion (with a large population 
                                                     
17
 The argument also doesn’t address the objection that an individual who evaluates his existence solely in 
terms of his own well-being and who has a decent level of well-being just below the population-value 
indifference level may still find his existence judged to be a social bad, even if it is bad for no one. 
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full of individuals who think their life is barely worth living). This problem would become 
even more pressing if there were people whose well-being (narrowly construed) is very low 
but who nevertheless believe strongly in the value of their existence. One may then obtain a 
variant of the Repugnant Conclusion in which a sufficiently large number of people who all 
have an arbitrarily low level of well-being (narrowly construed) but who all believe their 
existence is valuable has to be declared better than a smaller, well-off population. 
The second difficulty is that this approach suggests that one should use a lower population-
value indifference level of well-being (narrowly construed) for creating lives among 
populations who strongly believe in the value of their existence than for creating lives 
among populations who have no such beliefs. It would be strange to evaluate social 
situations with such a mechanical treatment of diverse philosophical views about the value 
of existence! In performing social evaluations, could it be right to assign greater value to the 
creation of individuals in certain sects whose members believe that their own existence 
fulfils God’s plan than to the creation of equally well-off individuals in other segments of 
society with a less grandiose view on the value of their existence? The practice of leaving it 
to genitors to decide whether to have children typically leads to larger families wherever the 
value of existence is deemed greater. But should the social evaluation criterion take these 
views on board and really adopt different population-value indifference levels of well-being 
for different sects? 
There is a clear dilemma here for liberals. Either one takes account of the value of existence 
as assessed by the members of the population. Then the social evaluation of variable 
population choices will, unappealingly, depend on sectarian views. Or only ordinary well-
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being considerations are taken on board, as in Broome’s approach, and the project is 
potentially divorced from what really matters to some people.  
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